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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The interests of the amici are contained within the motion to file
amicus curiae brief.
ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS
I.

Whether Padilla v. Kentucky substantially changed law in
Washington State.

II.

As Padilla v. Kentucky did not announce a new rule, whether it
should apply retroactively.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This brief relies upon the appellant’s statement of the case.
INTRODUCTION
Much is at stake when noncitizen defendants accept guilty pleas in
Washington courts. Given that deportation has become a virtually
automatic consequence for a broad range of convictions, failure to provide
effective assistance of counsel can, and often does, result in a devastating
blow that tears noncitizens away from “all that makes life worth living.”
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Deportation inflicts grave
emotional and financial harm on families, especially dependent U.S.
citizen children. See Jonathan Baum et. al, In the Child’s Best Interest?
The Consequences of Losing a Lawful Immigrant Parent to Deportation,
4-5 (2010).1 In 2009, Washington State children residing with at least one

1

Immigration authorities removed 46,486 parents of U.S. citizen children from the
U.S. in the six month period between January and June 2011 alone.

1

noncitizen parent accounted for 25.2% of the population under 18. 2 In
addition, our society as a whole bears the costs for these family
separations because dependent spouses and children of deportees must
rely on public assistance and other forms of governmental support to
survive. Baum, supra, at 5-6.
Given what is at stake for so many, and in light of the arguments
herein, Amici request this court to reconsider its decision in the instant
case or, in the alternative, withdraw its precedential designation. Had this
Court had the requisite briefing from Mr. Gomez’ appellate counsel
warranted by the complex issues presented, Amici believes the Court
could and would have reached a different conclusion. 3
ARGUMENT
I.

PADILLA SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THE LAW IN
WASHINGTON STATE

2

This and other significant demographic data regarding Washington State’s immigrant
population are available at the Migration Policy Institute’s Data Hub:
www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state.cfm?ID=WA#1.
3
In this case, the superior court ruled that it could not consider Gomez’s motion to
vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance because it had previously vacated
the conviction under RCW 9.94A.640, based on the passage of time and good behavior.
Gomez’s appellate briefing focused solely on that issue, and this Court correctly held that
the trial court erred in that regard. The State, however, brought up additional issues on
appeal regarding timeliness and retroactivity, which Gomez failed to address at
all. (Gomez did address those issues in his superior court briefing but the superior court
did not reach them). As discussed in this brief, those issues are hardly as one-sided as the
State’s briefing would suggest, and in fact Amici maintain that they should be resolved in
Gomez’s favor. However, the Court may find it more prudent to simply remove that
portion of its decision and remand to the superior court to consider timeliness and
retroactivity in the first instance. If the superior court’s ruling is appealed again, this
Court can then address the issues based on a complete record, and more thorough
briefing.

2

In reaching its decision in the instant case this Court relied upon the
State’s incorrect analysis to find that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky, --- U.S. ---, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) does not qualify
Mr. Gomez for an exception to the 1 year filing requirement for postconviction relief motions because the decision does not constitute a
substantial change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(6). While the State
got the test right for what constitutes a substantial change in law, it clearly
missed the mark in applying it to this case and this Court’s reliance on that
misguided analysis was misplaced.4 Gomez at 6, citing Br. Of Resp’t at 910. In light of the consequences to the many noncitizens and their families
who now unjustly face the severe penalty of deportation, Amici request
the Court to correct its error.
As the State articulated, the test for whether a new legal decision
constitutes a substantial change in law under RCW 10.73.100(6), is to
determine whether the defendant could have argued this issue before
publication of the new decision. State v. Olivera-Avila, 89 Wn.App. 313,
321 (1997). A brief review of Washington case law makes clear that, prior
to the Padilla decision, neither Mr. Gomez nor any noncitizen defendant
whose defense counsel failed to address the risk of deportation in the
course of representation could have availed themselves of the established
ineffective assistance of counsel test under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984).

4

Again, Amici recognizes the failure of Mr. Gomez’ appellate counsel to provide the
Court with briefing on the relevant issues.

3

There is no dispute that the Stickland test is well established. Gomez at
6 (“Padilla…applied existing settled law to the case facts”). However,
prior to Padilla, it was equally well-established in Washington law for
over 26 years that Strickland’s test did not apply to immigration-related
ineffective assistance claims. Since 1984 immigration-related ineffective
assistance claims were deemed “collateral” to the criminal conviction and
thus, outside the scope of counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties. See State v.
Malik, 37 Wn.App. 414, 416, review denied 102 Wn.2d 1023 (1984)
(Denying petitioners ineffective assistance claim on the grounds that “the
possibility of deportation, being collateral, was not properly a concern of
appointed counsel.”); State v. Holley, 75 Wn.App. 191, 197 (1994)
(“[D]eportation is a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction. Thus
the trial court is not required to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
when a defendant shows that his counsel failed to warn him of the
immigration consequences of a conviction.”); State v. Martinez-Lazo, 100
Wn. App. 869, 878 (2000) (“Deportation remains a collateral
consequence. Thus, the trial court was not required to grant Mr. MartinezLazo's motion to withdraw his plea.”); State v. Jamison, 105 Wn.App.
572, 593 (2001) (Defense counsel’s performance regarding immigration
consequences was “immaterial because deportation and exclusion from
reentry are collateral consequences of Jamison’s guilty plea, not part of his
punishment.”)

4

Thus, prior to Padilla, no decision in Washington permitted a postconviction motion premised on an immigration-related claim of ineffective
assistance.5
In order to apply Strickland to Mr. Padilla’s claim the High Court first
had to make clear that immigration consequences were squarely within the
ambit of defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at
1481. The Padilla Court itself recognized that by applying Strickland to
Mr. Padilla’s case it was creating a substantial change in states like
Washington that had relied upon the collateral consequences doctrine to
foreclose immigration-related ineffective assistance claims. Id. After first
noting that it had never applied the collateral consequences doctrine to
define defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties, and noting its long
recognition of deportation as a “particularly severe ‘penalty’”, the Court
held:
The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a
Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation. We conclude
that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to
Padilla's claim. Id.
In its subsequent decision in State v. Sandoval, the Washington
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that Padilla had overruled
Washington law on this issue. State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 163, 170, n.1
(2011) (“Padilla has superseded Yim’s analysis of how counsel’s advice

5

In In Re Yim, the Washington Supreme Court, in dicta, left open the limited
possibility that affirmative misadvice regarding immigration consequences “might
constitute a ‘manifest injustice’”. In Re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 589 (1999) No Washington
court had ever published a decision so holding.

5

about deportation consequences (or lack thereof) affects the validity of a
guilty plea.”).
II.

PADILLA DID NOT ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE AND,
THUS, APPLIES RETROACTIVELY

While it is clear that Padilla effected a significant change in
Washington law, it is equally clear that Padilla’s application of the
Strickland test to immigration-related ineffective assistance claims did not
forge a new federal constitutional rule and, thus, applies retroactively.
Although these positions may at first blush seem incompatible, a review of
the case law reveals that they are, in fact, aligned. Acknowledging both is
necessary to ensure justice for noncitizen defendants and their families.
Washington courts have generally followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s
standards, as set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-300 reh’g
denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989). Teague generally prohibits a federal court
from applying a “new rule” of constitutional criminal procedure
retroactively.6
Since state and federal courts have disagreed on whether Padilla
announced a new rule it is most useful to look directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s standards regarding retroactivity, and the discussion in
Padilla itself regarding whether the Court believed it was breaking new

6

The Washington Supreme Court has noted, however, that it is not bound by the
Teague standard when deciding, under RCW 10.73.100 (6), whether a ruling should
apply retroactively. State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 449, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 983
(2005) (“Limiting a state statute on the basis of the federal court’s caution in interfering
with State’s self-governance would be, at least, peculiar.”); In re Pers. Restraint of
Markel, 154 Wn.2d 262 (2005) (Teague doctrine does not “define the full scope of RCW
10.73.100(6).”).

6

ground.7
“[T]he standard for determining when a case establishes a new rule is
‘objective,’ and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not
necessarily mean a rule is new.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410
(2000) (citation omitted). Further,
[i]f the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-bycase examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of
specific applications without saying that those applications themselves
create a new rule. . . . Where the beginning point is a rule of this general
application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad
of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so
novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
Strickland’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel is a general one
that applies to a broad range of factual scenarios. Knowles v. Mirzayance,
566 U.S. 111, reh’g denied by In re Word, -- U.S. -- , 129 S.Ct. 2422
(2009). The generality of the rule, however, “obviates neither the clarity of
the rule nor the extent to which the rule must be seen as ‘established’ by
this Court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. See also, Tanner v. McDaniel, 493
F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1068 (2007) (“Each time that a
court delineates what ‘reasonably effective assistance’ requires of defense
attorneys with respect to a particular aspect of client representation…it can
hardly be thought to have created a new principle of constitutional law”).

7

Several courts have followed this approach in concluding that Padilla applies
retroactively. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 949 N.E.2d 892 (2011);
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3rd Cir. 2011); People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d
365, 377-78 (Ill. App. 2011); Denisyuk v. State, -- A.3d --, 2011 WL 5042332 at *8-9
(Md. 2011); Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565, 568-71 (Minn. App. 2011), State v.
Ramirez, __ P.3d __(N.M. Ct. App. April 16, 2012); But see Chaidez v. United States,
655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 11-820 (Dec. 23, 2011).

7

In applying the Strickland standard to Padilla’s claim, the language of
the opinion itself shows that the Justices did not believe they were creating
a new rule. The Court noted that in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), it
established that Strickland’s requirement of effective assistance of counsel
applied to advice regarding a plea offer. Padilla, at 1484. “Whether
Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim follows from Hill.” Id. at 1485, n.12.
In holding that defense counsel has an affirmative duty to advise
noncitizen defendants regarding immigration consequences, the Court
rejected the notion that it was imposing some new burden on defense
counsel. “For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally
imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of a client’s plea.” Id. at 1485.8
Further, Padilla itself involved a collateral attack on a guilty plea. Id.
at 1478. If the Court believed it was creating a new rule, it would not have
applied that rule to Mr. Padilla. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313
(1989) (“Under Teague new rules will not be applied or announced in
cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of two exceptions.”).
This fact alone warrants concluding that Padilla did not announce a new
rule. See People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. App. 2011).

8

In light of the procedural posture of the instant case, the issue of what were prevailing
professional norms at the time of Mr. Gomez’ plea and sentence are not presently before
the Court. However, Amici note that evidence supports that the prevailing norms
referenced and relied upon in Padilla existed prior to 1995. See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton
& Noah Kinigstein, Strategies for Ameliorating the Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: A Guide for Defense Attorneys, 23 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 425, 445
(1986); ABA Standard for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, 14-3.2 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp.
1986) (instructing defense counsel to advise clients about collateral consequences of
guilty plea, including deportation.)

8

One week after deciding Padilla, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in a collateral challenge similar to Padilla’s. The Court, vacated the
judgment and remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in
view of Padilla. Santos-Sanchez v. United States, -- U.S. -- , 130 S.Ct.
2340 (2010). The Court would not have issued such an order unless it
thought that Padilla applies retroactively since the Court will issue such
an order only when it believes an intervening decision would alter the
lower court’s ruling.9 Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996).
The core premise of Padilla reiterates what Strickland held more than
25 years ago: “The proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Padilla at
1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (internal quotation marks
omitted)). In the recent decision in State v. Chetty, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL
987779 (2012) the State opposed defendant’s motion for additional time to
file an appeal of his 2004 conviction which he asserted was premised on
immigration-related ineffective assistance, on the grounds that Padilla was
not retroactive. In remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing the
Division One Court stated:
However, here, the question is not whether Padilla is retroactive but,
rather, whether the professional norms in 2004 required defense counsel to
advise Chetty about the deportation consequences of the conviction and
the advantages and disadvantages of filing an appeal.

9

The Fifth Circuit reversed its original decision in light of Padilla. Santos-Sanchez v.
United States, 381 Fed. Appx. 419, 2010 WL 2465080 (2010).

9

Chetty, at 14. Given what is a stake, Mr. Gomez, and others like him,
deserve their day in court to determine whether their representation met
existing professional norms.
CONCLUSION
Subjecting noncitizens across the state who entered pleas prior to
March 31, 2010, and their families, to the devastating consequences of
deportation that will result from this decision is unwarranted and unjust.
Amici request this court to reconsider.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of April 2012,

for
Ann E. Benson
Washington Bar No. 43781
Attorney for Amici

Travis Stearns
Washington Bar No. 29335
Attorneys
for

Amici
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